



A
LETTER

FROM A

MERCHANT of the City of *London*,

TO THE

R---t H---ble *W---* P--- Esq;


UPON THE

Affairs and Commerce of NORTH AMERICA, and the WEST-INDIES; Our AFRICAN Trade; the Destination of Our Squadrons and Convoys; New Taxes, and the Schemes proposed for raising the extraordinary Supplies for the current Year.

*Soli omnium contigit tibi ut pater patriæ esses
antequam fieres.* PLIN.


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
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A
L E T T E R
F R O M A

MERCHANT of the City of *London*,

T O T H E

R—t H—ble *W—* P— Esq; &c.

S I R,

THE Writer of these Sheets has
T been conversant in Mercantile
and Commercial Affairs for up-
wards of Twenty Years, and in the Course
of that Time he cannot fail to have made
such Observations and Remarks upon our
Trade and Navigation, as may tend at this
Juncture, to the Advancement of both.
He should not, however, have been tempt-
ed to render public his Thoughts upon
these Subjects, if, in a Conversation with
a certain great Man, he had not been much
solicited thereto, and all his Arguments of
Excuse, baffled by that great Persuasion,

the Good of his Country. He flatters himself therefore, that you will not impute to Vanity what is founded in a quite different Motive, any more than think him Presumptive in daring to dedicate this Piece to a Person of such distinguished Talents and Power. Though unknown to you personally, he may well plead a Knowledge of your superior Abilities, as the principal Reason of this Dedication; the second is the Capacity you have of putting in Execution any wise and salutary Measures that may be proposed.

Commerce and Navigation are so immediately connected with the very Existence of this Nation, that whoever should discant upon the System that *England* ought to pursue in her Politics, without first marking how she must secure her Trade, and support her Dominion of the Sea; would resemble the Doctor who was entirely taken up with prescribing for his Patient preventatives for the Tooth-ach, while his Lungs were decaying with a deep Consumption. Although I am not so chimerically Systematic, as to urge we
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have no Connections whatever with the Continent; and that our Naval Force alone, without any Auxiliaries whatever, is sufficient, not only to protect our *American* Colonies and Settlements, but also to secure this Kingdom from all Invaders, and even pull down the Power of *France*, even when she should be united with the House of *Austria*, *Spain*, *Sicily* and the *Turk*: Altho' I am not infatuated with our Naval Strength to this Degree, Yet I am not unacquainted with the Superiority it gives us over all the Powers of *Europe*, not excepting even that Maritime Power, who so long contended with us for the Dominion of our *own* Seas, and which she now quietly possesses, when she has not a Fleet of twelve Men of War (fit to put to Sea) to support her Claim. Our Connections with the Continent should not be given up at this time to try Experiments upon our own Force, an Essay of this kind might prove much more than we should like, *that we are too opiniated with an established Militia, we build too much upon our Fleets.* This is not the Period to execute new Systems of Politics; the Season
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for such Tryals is Peace ; when no Enemy can thwart your Measures but by counter-Negotiations,—when you are not every Moment threaten'd with some new Enterprize, the Success of which may circumvent every End proposed by Treaties, though ever so well modell'd. Have we not a recent Instance of this in the *Czarina*? She engaged to furnish us with 53000 Men upon receiving 400,000*l.* a year when they should be in Motion, and 100,000*l.* (a yearly Subsidy of which has been already paid her) while they kept upon the Frontiers of *Livonia*, to be ready upon the first Call: What was the Sequel of this? These very Troops that were paid by the King of *Great Britain* to fight his Battles against the *French King*; were upon the King of *Prussia's* taking proper Measures to secure his Dominions from being wrested from him by the Empress Queen and the King of *Poland*, conjunctively with the *French King*; destined to traverse *Courland*, and make a Diversion in favour of the Allies of *France*. So that in fact we are paying the *Czarina* 100,000*l.* a year for employing 53,000 Men against us.

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The Inference I would draw from this is, that *Great Britain* must ever have Connections with the Continent as long as she would Trade to Advantage upon it; and where her commercial Interest therewith is not concerned, she has none. By a reciprocal commerical Interest, with the Protestant Powers of the *North* and *Germany*, such a Cement might be formed, as to render all subsidiary Gratifications needless; our Fleets should protect their Trade when incroached upon, their Armies should defend our Possessions when attacked, but without Fee or Reward. This is the Plan of Politics *Britain* should pursue. But a time of War is not the Period for laying a proper Foundation for so great a Superstructure. We must content ourselves at present with pursuing such a Plan as to prevent too great a Balance of Power in favour of the House of *Bourbon*, and when needful, employ such Bodies of Auxiliaries as may be necessary for our Protection, or the Assistance of our Allies,—at least untill our Militia shall be formed and trained to a proper Dis-

Discipline: In the mean while your Attention, Sir, cannot be too much fixed upon the Security of our Commerce, and the Force and Extent of our Navigation.

In the Course of this Epistle, I shall take the Liberty of marking what Provisions and Alterations may be necessary for the Protection of our Trade to *North America*, the *West-Indies*, and the Coast of *Africa*,—which are Branches of our Trade, that cannot be too much cherished and supported; and I shall at the same Time point out what appear to me the proper Destinations of our Fleets for the Annoyance of the Enemy, and of Convoys for the Protection of our Merchantmen, from their Ships of War and Cruizers.

As the present Quarrels which subsist in *Europe*, may be traced to the Squabbles, concerning our, and the *French American* Possessions; although a Plan may have been concerted, between the Empress Queen, the Czarina, and the King of *Poland*, for reducing the Power of the
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House of *Brandenburgh*, and dividing among them it's Possessions, upon the first favourable Opportunity, for a Disturbance of the Tranquility of *Europe*; it is reasonable to suppose that before the Plan of a lasting Peace can be formed for the contending Parties in *Europe*, the Limits of our *American* Colonies must be first ascertained, and all cause of Disturbance upon that Head be removed; and as there is no likelihood of our having these Matters settled to our Advantage by the *French* Ministers, without we can first prove by the Force of our Arms, as well as Treaties, (which are now broke) that our Claims are just, and the Repose of *Europe* will still be a great way off, even though the King of *Prussia*, should by his superior Abilities and great Military Skill, as a Prince and as a General, so extend his Conquests in *Bobemia* and even *Hungary*, as to oblige the Queen of that Name to propose Terms for a speedy Accommodation. To this End then I shall give my Sentiments upon carrying on the War in *America*, in such a manner as to oblige by our Success, the *French* to

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leave the just Bounds of our Provinces unmolested, and if a glorious Peace can be procured, to guaranty to us with the Powers of *Europe*, the Free and Uninterrupted Possession thereof.

But as this may at first seem not of sufficient Importance to gain the Attention of the several Powers of *Europe*, who will at the End of this War be contracting Parties in the Treaty of Peace; I shall give a small sketch of the Extent, Produce, and Advantages of our *North-American* Colonies.

The *English* claim all *North-America* to settle in by the Discovery of *Cabot*, in 1497. from Lat. 67, to Cape *Florida* in 25, called the *Newfoundlands*, till Sir *Walter Raleigh's* Voyage, in 1585. And from that Time named *Virginia* without Distinction. The *English* Settlements by Grants extend from Sea to Sea, or from *East* to the *West* Coasts of the Continent, where *New-Albion* was ceded by it's King, to Sir *Francis Drake* in 1577. King *James* the I. in 1606, made grants
to

to Two Companies, to One from Lat. 34 to 41, to the other from 38 to 45. *Carolina*, *Virginia Proper*, and *Maryland*, fell to one, to the other *New-England*, *New-York*, *New-Jersey*, and *Pensilvania*. Afterwards distinct Grants being made of them, under the Names of *Nova-Scotia*, and *New-Britain*, *Virginia*, or all *North-America*, became divided into less Parts undervarious Appellations. *Virginia Proper*, settled in 1607, by King *James*, is bounded by Grant to the *North*, from Lat. 41. to the *South* as far as Lat. 36, 30. which was run by Agreement in 1729, and the Government and Property thereof are in the Crown. *New-England*, included in the general *Virginia* Patent, was granted 1606, and settled in 1621, the Bounds Extend from Lat. 40 to 48 *North*, and *East*, and *West*, from Sea to Sea, if not possessed by any Christian State, as by Grant of *James* the I. November 3, 1621. *Nova-Scotia*, usurped by the *French* in 1603, and from whence they were drove by *Argal*, in 1613, was granted to Sir *William Alexander*, in 1621, and the Limits were prescribed to be St. *Lawrence's* River,

River, on the *North*, and on the *West St. Croix*. By a second Grant in 1635, it was enlarged to *Kennebek River*, to co-extend *Nova-Scotia*, with *Acadia* (so called by the *French*) granted by *Lewis XIII.* in 1633, which has been Five or Six Times Conquered by the *English*, and given up to the *French*, who in 1713 by the Treaty of *Utrecht*, ceded it entirely to Queen *Ann*, excepting *Cape Breton*, and the Property and Government thereof are in the Crown. *Maryland* before part of *Virginia*, granted to Lord *Baltimore*, by Patent of King *Charles I.* dated *June 20, 1632*, which was Named after the Consort of that Prince, was settled in 1633, and extends *North* to Lat. 40, *South* a few Miles below 38, *East* by the Ocean, and extends *West* to the Head of the *Potomac River*. The Property and Government hereof are in the Proprietor. The Two *Carolinas*, now called *North* and *South*, were one and the same Country, till 1729. Some *French Huguenots* made an Incurfion here in 1562, and built *Charles Fort* at *Port Royal*, but these were entirely demolished in 1564 by the *Spaniards*, and these

these were cut off by the *French* in 1567, and from that Period it was unsettled (except by a few *English*, in the Years 1622 and 1653) till it was granted to Eight Proprietors in 1665, from Lat. 36. 30. to 29. and *West* to the *South Sea*: the Charter was vacated in 1728, and Seven of the Proprietorships or Shares were bought in by the Crown, in whose Hands is the Government, and the People are possessed of the Property. *New-Jersey* lies between *Maryland*, *Pensilvania*, and *New-York*, being part of the *Dutch New Netherlands*; taken from them in 1664, and granted to the Duke of *York*, and by him to Lord *Berkley*, and Sir *George Carteret*. It was recovered by the *Dutch* in 1672, but they restored it to us in 1673, and in consequence thereof it was regranted to, and by the Duke in 1674, to the same Proprietors, who divided it by a Line from *South* to *North*; Lord *Berkley*, had the *West Jersey*, and Sir *George Carteret*, the *East Jersey*, which are now united Property in the Proprietors, but the Government and Jurisdiction were given up to the Crown in 1702.

New-York,

New-York, was first visited by *Hudson* in 1608, who gave his Name to the River, bought the Country of the Indians, and sold it to the *Dutch*; *Charles I.* laid claim and the States General disowned their Title to it, and the *Dutch* Company made an offer of it for 2500l, but they retreated, built Forts, and called it all with *New-Jersey*, the *New Netherlands*. It was conquered with *New-Jersey*, and granted to the Duke of *York*, and call'd *Yorkshire*, it's bounds first were *North* the River *St. Lawrence*, and the *South* Sea, *West*; but it is now confined to narrower Limits, towards the Sea Coast, exclusive of *Long-Island*, but grows broader towards the Country of the Six Nations, which is supposed to be comprised therein. The Property and Government are in the Crown. *Pennsylvania*, takes it's Name from the Proprietor *William Penn*, granted by King *Charles II.* in 1680, it's extent is from the beginning of the 40 to the 43, deg. of Latitude; and from the 5th Deg. of *Western* Longitude, from *Delawar* River, excepting 12 Miles round *Newcastle*. In 1682, the Duke of *York* granted to
Penn,

Penn, a Slip of the *New Netherlands* from 12 Miles *North* of *Newcastle*, *South* to Cape *Hinlopen* in 38, 45, which part is called the *Delaware* or lower Countries. The Property and Government are in the Proprietor. *Georgia* 'till 1732, made part of *South Carolina*, it was settled, separated and granted to a Corporation for 21 Years ; at the End of that Time the Government was to revert to the Crown.

These are the Possessions in *North America*, to which *England* has so just a Claim, and which being situated in so fine a Part of the Globe, as the same Latitudes with the most fertile Parts of *Europe*, *Africa*, and *Asia*, would necessarily produce such Fruits, Fish, Beasts, &c. as are not only useful in themselves but profitable to Trade, Manufactures and Navigation, since we find that where the Summers are hotter, and the Nights colder than in *England*, towards the Coast every Thing can be produced that can be here ; and it is to be imagined that if the interior Parts of the Country, particularly of *New England*, which are thus represented, were cleared
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from the great Quantities of Wood that there every where cover the Surface of the Earth, insomuch that the Sun cannot penetrate to warm it; the Fruitfulness of the Country would not yield to *Great Britain*. But, let us consider the present Products of *North America*, with Regard to Commerce and Navigation, and we shall be sufficiently satisfied with its Importance to both, to let no Part of it slip out of our Hands. *Georgia*, which is the most Southern Province, and which, till the Year 1732, was deserted by the Inhabitants of *South Carolina*, of which it then made Part, on Account of its Vicinity to *St. Augustine*, possessed by the *Spaniards*, being settled by Mr. *Oglethorpe*, has prospered abundantly, and produces Rice in great Quantities, Silk and Pot-ash; to which may be added considerable Crops of *Indigo*; and since the Duty upon this Commodity has been taken off in *Carolina* we plant it again there with great Success, and by that means may save 200,000*l.* a year, which we have for some years paid to the *French* for it.

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Our Trade to *Virginia* and *Maryland* is still of a more interesting Nature, since it not only increases the public Revenue with about half a Million of Money yearly, but brings into the Coffers of the *English* Merchants near the same Sum. The Staple Commodity of these two Colonies is Tobacco, but that of *Virginia* is chiefly the sweet Scented, and that of *Maryland* what is call'd *Oroonoko*; the former is principally consumed here and sent to *France*, and the latter is exported to *Holland*, *Germany*, and the *Baltic*.

The Advantage resulting to this Nation by the Tobacco Trade of *Virginia* and *Maryland*, may be partly nearly computed, by the Number of Ships there is employed and the Quantity imported, the greater part whereof is again exported. Upon a Medium of one year with another, there are 200 sail of Ships, from 100 to 400 Tons Burthen, freighted with Tobacco from those two Colonies to *England*, which import at least 100,000 Hogsheads, each Hogshead containing above 400 weight :

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Forty Thousand Hogsheads may be consumed in *Great Britain* and *Ireland*, *Guernsey*, *Jersey*, and the other inferior British Islands, and for which Forty Thousand Hogsheads of Tobacco, that are worth to us above 146,000*l.* Sterling, we should be obliged to pay ready Money to Foreigners, if these estimable Colonies were wrested from us. The Sixty Thousand Hogsheads, which we export, we now receive yearly 440,000*l.* Sterling for from Foreigners, in ready Money, or, what is the same Thing, in Goods, for which they would take no other barter, and we should be obliged to pay ready Money for; but this is not yet all the Advantage we receive from the Trade of *Virginia* and *Maryland*.—This very Money, which is remitted here for Tobacco exported, is laid out by the Planters Agents here in our Staple and other Commodities, which occasions another Freight for as many more Ships: And to this we must add a National Advantage, the Duty on the Forty Thousand Hogsheads of Tobacco consumed here, amounting to 500,000*l.* Sterling.

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It is evident from hence, how much the Article of Tobacco from these Colonies tends to maintain the Balance of Trade in our favour, and how much we are interested not only to protect *Virginia* and *Maryland*, but also to avoid, as far as possible, their labouring Men from being drawn away from their Work, in order to defend themselves and their Country. To these Articles let us subjoin, the vast Number of People that is maintained, and many of them enriched here at home by the Industry of their Countrymen in these two Colonies; for, except their daily Food, there is hardly any Thing they consume or make use of but what is manufactured in, or sent from their mother Country; and the Shipping, amounting to between three and four Hundred Vessels employed in the Trade, supports a great Number of our ablest Seamen, which adds to our Naval Strength, and might be a Means of manning a formidable Fleet in time of Necessity.

The next Province that presents itself
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to us for it's extraordinary Advantages to Trade and Navigation, is that of *New-England*, on account of the Quantities of Oak, Fir and Pine, fit for Masts for our Navy, and which might produce a sufficiency of Pitch, Tar, Rosin and Turpentine, for all our home Consumption, and prevent our Trade to the *Baltic* in these Articles having so much the Balance against us. In the clearing of the Province of *New-England*, particular Care should be had to demolish no Oak, Fir, or Pine of a proper Growth, or so situated as to be convey'd to the Shore without risking the breaking or spoiling it: The Underwoods and Trees of inferior Nature, particularly those in the more Western Parts of the Province, should be fell'd, for the making way for sowing Grain, &c. In this place, Sir, I cannot help remarking that a Clause in the Act of 11d. Geo. 11d. which prohibits the cutting of any white Pine Trees, of the Diameter of 24 inches, at 20 inches from the Ground, not growing within some tract of Land granted to some private Person before the 7th of October 1690, without his Majesty's Licence,

Licence, may prove very detrimental to the growth of White Pines of a proper size for Masts in such places of the Province of *New-England*, which are the most commodious for their Conveyance to the Sea Shore ; as many Places so situated are actually in the Occupation of Settlers who have received their Grants of Land, since the Year 1690, and as by this they will be induced to cut their Pine Trees fit for Masts, before they arrive at the Dimensions herein specified, and the Difficulty, Delay and Expence of granting Licences are so great, that very few have been applied for. I am not insensible of the Intention of this Clause, which I apprehend was inserted with a view of preventing any White Pines, of the Dimensions fit for Ships-Masts, being exported to assist the *French*, or other Naval-rival Powers in furnishing their Fleets therewith, and for the more securely appropriating them to our own Use ; but as Experience, Sir, has convinced us of the bad Consequence resulting to ourselves from this Clause, I and many more Merchants of this City, who have the Honour of the *British* Flag, and the Commerce

merce of these Realms much at Heart, entertain hopes of seeing this Bar to the growth of Pines of proper Dimensions, (and so situated as to be conveniently ship'd for *Old England*,) in the Province of *New England*, soon removed.

It would be needless, Sir, to add any more to a Person of your Judgment and Penetration concerning the removal of any Obstacle to our Maritime Power; therefore I shall quit this Digression, and finish my Account of the Mercantile Products of the Continent of *North America*, with *Nova Scotia*, which gave the first rise to our present Quarrel with the *French*, and which, it is to be hoped, will not be sacrificed to them either in whole or in part, in the expectation of gaining their Friendship, which if it were sincere, would be too dearly bought at so great a Price; for the Province already produces besides Timber, Planks, Deals, Hoops, Staves and other Sorts of Lumber; Corn, Fruit, Pease and other Pulse, and in several Places there are large Woods, the Trees whereof are as fit for Masts as those of *Norway*.

Norway. If there were occasion, Shipping of all kinds might be constructed here; the Oak Timber that grows in this Province being equal, if not superior to that of *Norway*: But if it were only for the Fish that is caught upon the Coasts of this Colony, it would be of no small Importance to us; Whales, Codfish and Salmon abound upon the Coast, as well as Mackerel, Pilchards, Shads, Trout, Scacows, &c.

The mention of our *American* Fishery naturally leads to that of *Newfoundland*, which for the Advantages it produces both to the Trade and Navigation of these Kingdoms, should be prefer'd to the Mines of *Peru*. No one can doubt this, when he considers that we bring from thence yearly between 2 and 300,000 hundred weight of Fish, besides 4 or 5000 Hogsheads of Oil, by which a very large Sum of Money is saved or brought into this Kingdom annually, and a very great Number of our best Seamen trained and supported. But the Quantities of Fish brought from thence to *Great Britain*, is not to be compar'd

par'd to what we furnish from thence, to the *Portuguese*, *Spanish*, and *Italian* Markets, as well as our Sugar Colonies and the other *West Indian* Islands, so that the increase that this Trade makes to the National Stock, cannot be computed at less than 3 or 4000 Thousand Pounds *per Annum*; for a Ship of 100 Tons, with the Charge only of Victuals and Fishing Tackle for Twenty Hands, will bring to Market in *Portugal*, *Spain* or *Italy* 3000*l.* worth of Fish, and frequently clear 2000*l.* for the Proprietors, so that according to this Calculation, which is not over rated, 150 Ships only will clear 300,000*l.* and consequently increase the public and private Stocks so much.

Having thus given as concise an Account as I possibly could of our *North American* Settlements, which needs no further Illustration to prove their Importance; it is time to consider the most effectual Methods of securing them against the Invasions of the *French*, who have long since laid the Plan for wresting them from us, being perswaded that untill they shall

shall have weaken'd *England* in her Commerce by the loss of her *American* Colonies, her Trade and Navigation will (if properly exerted) always protect her from the Power of *France*; and consequently the great Project of universal Monarchy can never be compassed by the *French* 'till they have destroy'd our Commerce and Navigation, which they cannot more effectually do, than by worming us out of the Continent of *North America*. In order to facilitate this, they are building a Chain of Forts to circumscribe the *English* Settlements, and cut us off from all Communication of Alliance, or Trade with the *Indian* Nations; to confine our Settlements within such Limits as the *French* are pleased to prescribe the *English* Provinces; and also with a View of joining *Louisiana* and *Canada*, and at the same time making themselves Masters of the *Lakes*, and in the End render the whole Continent a Possession of *France*.

From this it appears it will be necessary for the Protection of our Settlements, to circumvent this Plan of Operations of

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the *French*; that is to say, make ourselves a communication, for forming Alliances, and Trading with the *Indian* Nations; render the Project of a Junction between *Louisiana*, and *Canada* abortive, and demolish the chain of Forts within which we shall otherwise be immured. The only Method that I can devise for frustrating this Plan, is to become Masters of the *Indian* Countries so as to secure ourselves and protect the *Indians* our Allies: And to compass this we must either dispute with Arms every pass in the Country, and then secure them with Forts and Garrisons, or become Masters of the *Lakes*, and by that means gain the Sovereignty of that Navigation.

But as the *French* Government in *Canada* is a Military united Power, every way trained to Martial exercise, and the Inhabitants of our Colonies, live by their Labour, and are not accustomed to the use of Arms; it will necessarily follow that if we propose succeeding, we must either employ Auxiliaries, or endeavour at the Dominion of the *Lakes*.

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As we have been so unfortunate as to lose *Oswego*, and with it all our Navigation of *Lake Ontario*, we should immediately execute some Enterprize to regain if possible the Sovereignty of that *Lake*; or if that should appear not so practicable as could be wished, we should engage the *Senekies* to go and settle upon the Banks of *Lake Erie* at the Mouth of the River *Miamis*, where a Fort should be instantly built in as strong a Manner as possible, be fortified with a good Garrison partly, if not all *English*, who should forward the constructing of at least twenty Brigantines and Chaloupes, which should be built and fitted by, at farthest, next Summer. *

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* If this should appear impracticable in *America* within the Time limited, as a longer Delay would be of the most fatal Consequence to the Provinces of *Pensilvania*, *New York*, and indeed we might add all, by the junction which otherwise the *French* will in all probability effect between *Louisiana* and *Canada*, by means of their possessing *Oswego*,
&c.

The Navigation of the *Lake* Champlain should be next considered; but as the *French* Fort at *Crown Point*, will in all probability be a great Obstacle to our obtaining the Navigation of this *Lake*; I shall first consider the most probable Means of obliging the *French* to evacuate that place.

The Parliament granted last Year on Account of *American* Services 279,704 *l.* 15. without including any part of the Million granted to enable his Majesty “ to “ concert and take all such Measures, as “ might be necessary to disappoint or defeat any Enterprizes or Designs of his “ Enemies, and as the Exigency of “ Affairs might require;” some of which it is reasonable to imagine has been employed for the security of our *American* Colonies, since by the Designs of our Enemies the Affairs of our Countrymen of those Parts, have been since that Time in a very perilous Situation. And although

&c; the different parts of these Vessels might be constructed here in such a Manner as to be convey’d to *America*, and there joined.

although so great a Sum has been expended since last Year on our Colonies, I am sorry to find they have been so ill protected,——but as it shall not be the subject of this Letter to point out defects in the former Administration any further than they are absolutely necessary to guide us like Landmarks, in avoiding Shoals and dangerous Coasts; so I shall wave discussing the Causes of our late Ill success, where they can be no wise useful to our future Conduct. But an observation cannot be passed over in this Place, which is, that tardy and starved Measures may be reckoned the principal sources of the Misfortunes of the inglorious Year 1756. These, then let us particularly avoid, and as his Majesty has graciously and judiciously told his Parliament, “ I rely on your
 “ Wisdom, that you will prefer more vi-
 “ gorous Efforts (though attended with a
 “ large Expence) to a less effectual, and
 “ therefore less frugal plan of War,” let us not stint our Measures with a view of saving a few Thousand Pounds, when by the expending them we may attain at present, what hereafter, may cost us as many
 Millions,

Millions,—and which then may be only ineffectually thrown away.

With this View then, we should not, on the one Hand, grudge any necessary Expence for the Security of our *American* Possessions, or should we on the other, lavish away any Money needlessly, though the Measure might carry with it the Appearance of Efficacy. But instead of 200,000 and odd Pounds, which were granted for *America* last Year, if two Millions had been granted, and *Oswego* had been still in our Possession, and *Crown-Point* taken, we should have been Gainers by the Balance ; but as it turned out not only all that Money was lost, but our Possessions, our Soldiers, and the Time that we should have employed in defeating the *French* Schemes, destroying the Chain of Forts they were building to circumscribe our Colonies, and making ourselves a Way into the *Indian's* Country to traffick with them, and gain their Alliance.

In Order to avoid the Artifices of designing Men, and such there may be in
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the Colonies, who may have an Interest of protracting the War, as long the Remittances for the Support of Troops pass through their Hands; for we have had several Hints of this Kind already, and the Siege of *Cape Breton*, it is said, furnished some striking Examples of the Avidity of some *New England* Agents, with Regard to *Old England's* Money: With a View of entirely preventing any such Deceit, and of keeping the labouring People to their Work in the Colonies, it would be prudent to send over a sufficient Number of Forces, with those Regulars that are there already to oppose the *French* Regulars, and engage as many *Indians* in our Service as may be necessary to make Head against their *Indians*; for regular Troops, or even Provincials, that will not submit to the *Indian* Manner of swamp Fighting, can never have any Share with the *Indians*.

It is said we are to send over Ten Thousand Men this Spring to reinforce the Troops under Lord *Loudon*; a less Number will be insufficient, and yet we hear
but

but of Three Thousand *Highlanders* that are to be raised upon this Occasion, surely we cannot spare Seven Thousand more of the Troops in *Great Britain* to be sent to *America* ; as our *Hanoverian* and *Hessian* Auxiliaries, are to tarry here no longer than the latter End of *February* : therefore I should think it expedient to engage as many *Swiss* in our Service, which might be effected at a very reasonable Rate ; notwithstanding the War that is lighting up upon the Continent, since the principal of the Cantons have resolved to have their Subjects remain Neuter as to the Continental War, which in all Appearance will prove a Religious one, and therefore might be of dangerous consequence to the Cantons of different persuasions. If a sufficient Number of *Swiss*, could not be engaged, which it were to be wished might, on Account of their Knowledge of Arms, and Power of bearing Fatigue ; suppose the deficiency were to be drawn from the *Palatines* and other *German* Emigrants, now inhabiting the Province of *Pennsylvania* ; and since the Inhabitants of this Province are
for

for the greater part Quakers, and preach up the Doctrine of Non Resistance, they should, if they have any Desire of being protected and remain in Quietness, at least pay those who fight their Battles; by which means a sufficient Number of these Emigrants might be maintained for the public Service without being at any Charge to the Government; for it would be unreasonable for a Person who occupies as much Land as any forty can Till &c. not to support four for the Protection of it. However it is absolutely necessary that the Army under Lord *Loudon* should be reinforced very early next Spring, and as the *Scotch* Battallions will not be sufficient, and it were better and more agreeable to the People to send Foreigners to *America* to fight our Battles, than bring them here to remain Idle and breed a Famine; if a sufficient Number of *Swiss* cannot be procured, the Palatines in *America* might make up the Deficiency, or an equivalent Number of *Scotch* (over and above the two Battallions) be sent, and if the Army under Lord *Loudon* can be augmented to 20000 Regulars by the last

of *May* next, they, with the *Indians* in our Alliance, would bid fair for taking *Crown Point* by the End of *June*.

But let it be remembered, that without this Reinforcement arrives in *America*, and joins the Army before the *French*, at *Crown-Point*, can be sufficiently strengthened from *Europe*, to make head against us, all our hopes of the next Campaign, by Land, may be laid aside, since if we do not succeed at *Crown-Point*, and the *French* should penetrate but as far as *Albany*, they would bid fair to alarm the out Settlers, who would not hesitate to fly to the *Eastern* Parts. But not to permit my Imagination to bewilder itself any further with such a disagreeable Scene, I will believe the present Administration prudent enough to prepare, and have such a Number of Forces ready to embark by the End of *March* at farthest, which should be the longest Term permitted for their tarrying on this side the *Atlantic*.

Then let me remind you, Sir, to be particularly careful what Contractors you engage with, what Superintendents you employ, for such another ignorant Embark-

Embarkation and Expedition, as that of last Year to *America*, will not only go near to Ruin, or rather give up to the *French*, all our Colonies; but even so far exhaust the public Treasure, by means of a Prolongation of the present War, (which can never be terminated to our Advantage, unless we succeed in *America*, and which however successful in *Europe*, cannot recompense the Loss of a single Colony in *America*) that our National Debt may be increased from 85 Millions to 170 Millions, without our reaping one single Advantage from it to the Public, — some private Fortunes indeed may be made. If these Contractors are to be paid for 100,000 Trusses of Straw, at an extravagant Rate to be sent to *America*, which will be rotten before they arrive there, where any Quantity may be had for little or nothing — If the Embarkation is defer'd for Three Months after every thing is ready, because the Remittances cannot be made immediately, to pay the Troops in *America* a Year's Pay, and which some principal Officers may chuse to have the Fingering of before they set out,

—— I say Sir, if any such Imposition, or Impediment, should encrease the Expence of, or obstruct our Spring Expedition to *America*, the People will on the one hand have reason to Complain —— on the other to Mourn.

But these are only meant as Hints, not as Predictions, and I hope they will not be without their use. Therefore I shall indulge myself with a Prospect of proper Measures in *America*, and they crowned with Success so far as to our being Masters of Lake *Champlain*, which should be secured to us by some Armed Ships thereon, as well as a strong Fort, if *Crown Point* should be too much demolished, or found insufficient for the Protection of the Lakes *St. Sacrement*, and *Champlain*, —— which I believe it would not, however it should be well Garrisoned.

It would be necessary also to keep some Armed Vessels upon the Lakes *Huron*, and *Miskigan*, and a Fort built near the Bay of *Saguinam*, upon the Lake *Huron*; and another at *Miskouakimina*, upon Lake *Miskigan*, would be a Means
of

of securing to ourselves the Navigation of all the great Lakes, except *Ontario*, and *Superior*, the First of which might be wrested from the *French*, by seizing *Oswego*, and the other supplied if it should be found necessary. If our Efforts could be so far crowned with Success, we must imagine that the *French* would soon give up all their forged Claims upon our *American* Possessions, then we might execute a farther Plan of gaining over to our Interest, the principal if not all the *Indian* Nations, for as we can furnish them with what Commodities they require, at a cheaper Rate than the *French*, they would not frequent the *French Markets*, — but then perhaps we might not gain their Confidence and their real Alliance, (instead of their pretended) — therefore the best Method to gain this, would be by giving Præmiums to such *English* as would intermarry with the *Indians*, then they would by their own natural Ties, be rivited to our Interest, as it would make part of their own. But prior to this we should be particularly careful not to leave any of our *Indian* Allies, in the Lurch at the

End

End of the War, for otherwise they might afterwards behave towards us, as they did towards the *French* in 1702, when War breaking out between us, and the *French*, all the Artifices that the *French* Missionaries could practise, were insufficient to excite the *Indians* to take Arms against us; which was owing to the ill usage of the *French*, at the Treaty of *Ryswick*, who then left the *Indians* to shift for themselves.

BEFORE I quit the Subject of *North America*, I am induced to take Notice of the usefulness of a Fort or two being erected, and a Garrison maintained near the *Isle* of *Quirpon*, or the *Bay* of *Moluo*, on the *Island* of *Newfoundland*, since fatal experience has convinced us that the *French* have found a Passage by the Streights of *Belleisle*, for a large Squadron; as by this Means they might be prevented rendering this Passage of any Use to them for the future, since it appears that only one or two Ships of any considerable Force can pass or repass this way at a Time, so that our Forts would block up this Passage while a Fleet so Stationed as Admiral *Boscawen's*

Boscawen's was in 1755, would make sure of the *French* Fleet, between *Cape Raye*, and the *Island* of *St. Paul*. Perhaps some other Fortifications upon the *Southern* Coast of *Newfoundland*, as well as many Improvements in the interior Parts of the *Island*, would tend not only to the Security, but also to the Advantage of that important Fishery ; but as I consider these Improvements fitter to be thought of in a time of Tranquility than at present, I shall not insist upon any other Operations, being absolutely necessary at this Time at *Newfoundland*, than the erecting a sufficient Number of Forts, to Command the Streights of *Belleisle* — this will be absolutely Necessary, since it will appear in the sequel of this Treatise, that we can never keep a Squadron of proper Force upon the *North American* Station, for Convoys, Coastwise, and the impeding of any considerable *French* Squadron, both by the passage between *Cape Breton*, and the *Southern* part of *Newfoundland*, and by the Streights of *Belleisle*.

WHILE

WHILE we are thus busied with *North America*, let us not forget other Objects, of great Importance, for such must ever be our *West Indian Islands*, on account of the great Revenue and saving that accrue from thence by their Sugar, Molasses, Rum, Cotton, and we might add if properly cultivated (particularly on the *Island of Barbadoes*) Indigo, Piemento, Oranges, Limes, Citrons, Pomegranets, Guavas, Plantines, Cocoa-Nuts, India-Figgs, Prickle-Pears, Melons, &c. But although we have been alarmed for some considerable Time, with the Designs of the *French* upon the *Island of Jamaica*, that so much envied Spot! we have not yet sent any Force to oppose what Attempt our Enemies may chuse to make upon it; and which according to the best Accounts, there is neither Force by Land or Sea, to oppose. But if *Jamaica*, is in great Danger from the *French*, at *St. Domingo*, who would be glad of an Opportunity of seizing it, if it were only to present His Catholic Majesty with it, in order to intice him to join his Arms with those of *France* against us,

what must our *Leeward* Islands be, when we consider the *French* are now in actual Possession of *Dominica*, *St. Lucia*, *St. Vincent*, and *Tobago*, which should be neutral Islands? *Tobago*, is not above 40 Leagues from *Barbadoes*, which at this Time is in a very feeble Condition, on account of the decay of all the principal Fortifications of that Island; and if they were to seize upon this and *Antigua*, which is not improbable when we consider the Smallness of our Fleet in the *Leeward* Islands, and the want of Repairs in the Fortifications of *English Harbour*, would not *St. Christopher's*, *Montserrat*, *Nevis*, and the smaller Islands, to the *Westward* of them, necessarily fall into their hands? and then if *Jamaica* were in Security, it would be of no Use to us, as not a single *Merchantman*, could pass or repass to it, without a Convoy superior to the Naval Power of *France*. So that it evidently appears, if we leave the *French* in the quiet Possession of the neutral Islands, we shall run great Risk of losing all our *West-India* Trade. But on the other hand, if we send a sufficient Fleet to protect our own Islands,

and drive the *French* from their Usurpations, at *Dominica*, *St. Lucia*, *St. Vincent*, and *Tobago*, we may not only possess ourselves of those Islands, but save considerable Sums, that must necessarily be employed in superior Convoys, if they continue there, even without attacking our Colonies; and in the End prevent any future Squabbles, at a Time of Peace making, concerning their Possessors.

If we should have the good Fortune to succeed, in dispossessing the *French* from these Islands, it will be necessary to keep a sufficient Squadron Stationed here for their Protection, when Overtures of Peace may be made, or even after it's Conclusion; for we may remember that in the very Interval between the Cessation of Arms in *Europe*, and the Ratification of the Treaty of *Utrecht*, the *French* equipped and sent privately a Squadron with Troops on board, to invade, take and destroy the *British* *Caribee* Islands, as the envied Rivals of the *French* Sugar Trade. *Antigua* was to have been the first Sacrifice, as the principal and most Advantageous to the
English,

English, on Account of it's excellent Harbours and Situation in the Track of Navigation to the other *Leeward* Islands, as also to *Jamaica*. But this Expedition failed; we may attribute the Frustration of it to the Vigilance of the Inhabitants, as well as to some lucky Incident—for our Naval Armament was no wise concerned in opposing it. But the Vengeance that failed being wreaked upon *Antigua*, fell upon *Montserrat*, and here Mr. *Cassart*, who was Commander in chief of this *French Enterprise*, spread so much Desolation that the poor Inhabitants feel to this Hour, the unhappy Effects of our not being prepared in that Quarter with a formidable *English* Squadron. If we were not sufficiently apprised at this Time of the Address of the *French*, of making Incroachments upon our Territories, particularly in *North America*, to warn us against them for the future, I should recommend a strict Eye, to their not setting Foot again in the (*now*) Neutral Islands, by Artifice, if they could not by Force. But we are no longer blinded by Designs of this Kind, and if we should

should be happy enough to add *Dominica*, *St. Lucia*, *St. Vincent*, and *Tobago*, to our other Possessions in the *West-Indies*, we shall, it's to be hoped, never lose them again by *French* Incroachments.

To consider our Sugar Colonies in the Abstract, is to consider the Anatomy of the Body without the Circulation of the Blood. The Vitals of our *West-Indian* Islands are our *African* Settlements; if through *Negligence*, *Caprice*, *wrong applied Parsimony*, or *Ignorance*, these should ever happen to be lost — our Sugar Colonies are no more. This is of so notorious a Nature, that every Act of Parliament, which has been passed for Extending or Improving our Trade to *Africa*, has recited in the Preamble, the great Advantage of the Trade to *Africa*, for supplying the Plantations and Colonies thereunto belonging, with a sufficient Number of Negroes.

Thus it appears, then, that all our Efforts for the Security or extent of our *West-Indian* Islands, however they may promise fair
for

for rivalling the *French* in the Sugar Trade (that vast Commerce!) will be of no Avail, without we can properly defend our Settlements upon the Coast of *Africa*, and prevent the *French* continuing their Incroachments upon our Rights there, which they have already begun upon the Coast of *Guinea*; for though we have been possessed of the Trade, particularly on the Gold Coast, *Whydah*, and *Gambia*, upwards of Eighty Years, the *French* are daily undermining us there, so that if by open Force they do not exclude us from all Trade to *Africa*, they will at least by degrees worm us out of it, as they have already done upon the Gum Coast; if we do not immediately take such salutary Measures, as may effectually frustrate this long and deep laid Design of the *French*; and as this appears a Matter of so much Importance, I shall examine it with some Particularity.

The first *English* Ships sent to *Africa* on account of Trade, was about the Year 1553, from that Time the Trade to that Country was carried on by private Hands
till

till the Year 1758 ; when Queen *Elizabeth*, by her Letters Patent, constituted a Company for the more effectual carrying on the said Commerce, which was at that Time only for *Gold*, *Elephants Teeth*, and *Malaquetta* ; for the *English*, not then having any Settlements in the *West-Indies*, had no Occasion for Slaves. In the Reigns of *James*, and *Charles I.* the Company was greatly encouraged ; but the *Dutch* having in the Year 1637 taken several Forts on the Coast of *Africa*, they committed great Depredations on the *English*, in order to oblige them to leave off trading to that Part of the World. King *Charles II.* being apprized of this Behaviour of the *Dutch*, the better to enable his Subjects to carry on the said Trade, against the unjust Pretensions and Usurpations of these *New-comers*, by his Letters Patent of the 10th of *January* 1662, he incorporated a Body of Merchants, by the Title of the Company of *Royal Adventurers of England to Africa*.

The Subscriptions for carrying on this precarious Trade not answering the Expectation

pectation of the Merchants incorporated by this Patent, their Affairs soon became in a very embarrassed Situation, and they were involved in great Debts and Difficulties, by which they were rendered incapable of continuing their Trade in an advantageous Manner; in consequence of which they agreed for a certain Sum of Money, to surrender their Charter to the Crown, and to assign all their Estates and Effects, both at home and abroad, to certain Merchants, who intended to erect a new Company, for the more effectual carrying on the Trade to *Africa*. Pursuant to this Agreement, the King, having accepted of the Surrender of the said Charter, did, by his Letters Patent of the 27th of *September*, 1672, incorporate the late Royal *African* Company, with a Power to trade in *Africa*, from the Port of *Sallee* to the *Cape of Good Hope*, during the Term of *a thousand Years*, exclusive of all his other Subjects.

The Company, by Virtue of this Royal Grant, made a considerable Progress in erecting Forts, and settling Factories; but
their

their Trade being laid open by Parliament in the Year 1697; they were rendered unable to support the said Forts, wherefore it was enacted, that all private Traders to *Africa* should pay 10 *per Cent.* to the Company for the Privilege of trafficking upon that Coast. From the Year 1713 to 1730, whilst the Company had no Allowance from the Public, for the Support of their Forts and Settlements, private Traders made great Fortunes, while the Company, not without some Mismanagement, sunk under the weight of their Burthen, insomuch that they were obliged to apply to Parliament for Relief, who granted them 10,000 *l.* a Year till 1746.

From that Period to 1749, the Affairs of that Company were entirely at a Stand, no Grant having been made for three Years, and the Company were indebted 130,000 *l.*, their Forts and Castles in a ruinous Condition, their Credit and Reputation lost.

At this Time the Parliament took the Trade to *Africa* into Consideration, and an

an Act was passed in Consequence, by which it was enacted, " That all his Majesty's Subjects, who shall trade to or from any of the Ports or Places of *Africa*, between *Cape Blanco*, and the *Cape of Good Hope*, shall for ever after be a Body Corporate and Politic, in Name and in Deed, by the Name of *The Company of Merchants trading to Africa*, and by the same Name shall have perpetual Succession, and shall have a common Seal; and by that Name shall and may sue, and be sued, and do any other Act, Matter, and Thing, which any other Body Corporate or Politic, as such, can or may lawfully do." — " That it shall not be lawful for the Company, established by this Act, to trade to or from *Africa*, in their Corporate or Joint Capacity, or to have any joint or transferrable Stock, or to borrow or take up any Sum or Sums of Money on their Common Seal." — " That the Direction and Management of the Affairs of the said Company hereby established, shall be in and by a Committee of Nine Persons, to be chose annually, as hereaf-

“ ter is mentioned, who are to meet and
 “ assemble together, from Time to Time,
 “ as often as shall be necessary, at some
 “ Place in the City of *London*, and the
 “ Committee-men for the Time being,
 “ or any five or more of them, or the ma-
 “ jor Part so assembled, shall from and after
 “ the thirtieth Day of *June*, 1750, have
 “ full Power, from Time to Time, to
 “ make Orders for the governing, main-
 “ taining, preserving, and improving the
 “ Forts and Factories already built, with-
 “ in the Limits aforesaid ; and to appoint
 “ Governors, Deputy-Governors, or any
 “ other Officers, Civil or Military, of or
 “ for the said Forts and Settlements, and
 “ them to remove and displace when they
 “ shall see fit ; and to make Orders and Re-
 “ gulations for the better Government of
 “ the said Officers and Servants abroad,
 “ and to take Security from them for
 “ their good Behaviour, and for their
 “ paying due Obedience to the Regula-
 “ tions established by this Act, and to
 “ such Orders and Regulations the said
 “ Committee shall from Time to Time
 “ think proper to make ; so as no Order

“ or Regulations, to be made by the said
 “ Committee, shall tend to lay any Re-
 “ straint whatsoever on the said Trade or
 “ Traders to or from *Africa*, contrary to
 “ the true Intent and Meaning of this
 “ Act.” The Freemen by this Act are
 to pay 40 s. for their Freedom, who are
 to elect the Nine Members of the Com-
 mittee, three of whom are to be of *Lon-*
don, three of *Bristol*, and three of *Liver-*
pool. By this Act it is also enacted, “ That
 “ the said Committee shall and may from
 “ Time to Time, invest such Part of the
 “ Money in their Hands as they shall
 “ judge necessary in the Purchase of
 “ Goods, and Stores, which after the same
 “ are insured, which they are hereby
 “ impowered and required to procure to
 “ be done, are to be sent and exported to
 “ *Africa*, there to be sold, disposed of,
 “ and applied for the sole Use, Preserva-
 “ tion, and Improvement of the Forts
 “ and Settlements there, and for the Pay-
 “ ment of the Salaries and Wages to the
 “ Officers, and other Persons employed
 “ for keeping and preserving the said
 “ Forts and Settlements, and not otherwise:
 “ But

“ But it shall not be lawful for the said
 “ Committee to carry or cause to be carried
 “ or exported from *Africa*, any Negroes or
 “ other Goods, in return for the said
 “ Goods they shall so export from *Great*
 “ *Britain*, or in any other Manner to
 “ carry on any Trade to or from *Africa*.”
 “ — That the said Committee, out of the
 “ Monies they shall receive, shall deduct
 “ annually a Sum, not exceeding the Sum
 “ of eight Hundred Pounds, for defray-
 “ ing in the first Place, the Salaries of
 “ their Clerks, and Agents at *London*,
 “ *Bristol* and *Liverpool*. The House Rent
 “ of their Office in *London*, and all other
 “ Charges of Management, Commission,
 “ or Agency in *England*, and the Residue
 “ of the said Eight Hundred Pounds shall
 “ be shared and divided among themselves,
 “ as they shall judge proper, as a Com-
 “ pensation for their Trouble and Attend-
 “ ance in the said Office of Committee
 “ Men ; and the rest of the Monies which
 “ the said Committee shall receive for the
 “ Admission of Persons into the Freedom
 “ of the said Company, shall be applied
 “ and appropriated wholly to the Main-
 tainance,

" tainance, Support and Improvement of
 " the Forts and Settlements already built,
 " or which hereafter shall be built on the
 " Coast of *Africa*, which shall be in the
 " Possession of the said Company; and
 " for keeping them in good Repair; and
 " for providing Ammunition, and other
 " Stores, and Officers and Soldiers to de-
 " fend the same; and for paying the said
 " Officers and Soldiers; and to and for
 " no other Use whatever."

Thus the old Royal *African* Company
 was abolished, having received in conse-
 quence of a Resolution of the House of
 Commons of the 28th of *January* 1752,
 the Sum of 112,142*l.* 3*s.* 3*d.* as a full
 Compensation for their Charters, Lands,
 Forts, Castles, Slaves, Military Stores,
 Books, Papers, and all other Effects what-
 ever, to be applied as follows: 84,652*l.*
 12*s.* 7*d.* to satisfy the several Creditors;
 1695*l.* 3*s.* to the Commissioners appoint-
 ed to examine and state the Creditors
 Claims; 23688*l.* 15*s.* 5*d.* to satisfy such
 of the Proprietors of *African* transferable
 Stock, as were possess of the same on
 the

the 31st of *December* 1748, being 10 *per Cent.* and 2105*l.* 12*s.* 3*d.* to satisfy such Proprietors as were possessed of Stock since that time, being after the Rate of 5 *per Cent.*

Since the Year 1749, the Parliament has granted every Year the Sum of 10,000*l.* (excepting the Years 1750, 1753 and 1755, when 16000*l.* were granted) for the Support and Repair of their Forts and Settlements upon the Coast of *Africa*.

It is now time to consider in what condition these Forts really are, and whether they could oppose an attack made by our powerful Enemy the *French*, as there is too much Reason to apprehend they are upon the Point of making by a Fleet, which lately sail'd from *Brest*; whilst, as I am informed, we have not three Men of War upon the *African* Coast to protect them.

1. *James Fort* in the River *Gambia*, though mounted with 36 Guns is not able to resist any *European* Enemy.

2. *Anna-*

2. *Annamabo Fort* not yet finished.
3. *Tantumquerry Fort*, of 13 Guns. } Not able to make any
4. *Winnebab Fort*, of 16 Guns. } resistance to an *Europe-*
5. *Aecra Fort*, of 36 Guns. } an Enemy.
6. *Wydab Fort*, formerly of 35 Guns, but now deserted.
7. *Commenda Fort*, of 31 Guns. } In general out of Re-
8. *Succondee Fort*, of 29 Guns. } pair.
9. *Dixcove Fort*, of 30 Guns. }
10. *Cape Coast Castle*, of 40 Guns. } In a State of
11. *Fort Royal*, of 12 Guns. } Defence
12. *Phipps's Tower*, of 5 Guns. } proper to keep the
13. *Queen Ann's Point*, of 5 Guns. } Natives in Awe.

By this Account, which I do not pretend to publish as authentic, but which was given me by a Person trading to the Coast, who lately came from thence, and who

who could have no view in deceiving me ; it appears that notwithstanding our thirteen Forts, a Fleet of only Eight Men of War could drive all the *English* from *Africa*, by which our Sugar Colonies would be ruined, from whence we should then get no Sugar, Rum, Melasses, Cotton, Ginger and Aloes, in return for our Woollen and other Manufactures sent from here, which pay Duties to the Crown ; and which also they furnish to our *North American* Settlements, in return for Shipping, Horses, Boards, Staves, Hoops, Lumber, Timber for Building, Fish, Bread, Bacon, Corn, Flour, and other Plantation Necessaries ; — for then, by means of the *French*, ingrossing the Slave Trade, (and with it that of Elephant's Teeth, Gums, Dye-woods, Drugs, Bees-Wax, Gold, &c.) upon the Coast of *Africa*, they would ruin our Sugar Colony Planters, and furnish all the foreign Markets, as well as our own, with Sugar, which, by the same Means, and new Imposts, they did, till lately, with Indigo.

A Matter of such great Importance, to have slippt the Observation of the late M——ry, may perhaps be not so extraordinary ; as its escaping your Attention, Sir, only for one Session of Parliament ; since the Method of securing our Possessions upon the Coast of *Africa*, appears to me, to only demand a small Squadron of Men of War being stationed there, and proper Funds for the Repair and Support of the Forts already erected, and rendering them fit to oppose any Enemy, as well as the Natives ; for it cannot be surprizing that they should be in so defenceless a Situation, when only 10,000 *l.* a Year has been paid for their Maintenance, (except three Years 16,000 *l.*) since the Constitution of the new Company, when the Royal *African* Company estimated at a Time they were 130,000 *l.* in Debt, and had no Hopes of a Parliamentary Support, that their Forts could not be kept upon a respectable Footing under 20,900 *l.* 2 *s.* 6 *d.* a Year, according to the following Distribution,

	£.	s.	d.
Cape-Coast Castle	7779	00	00
I			Ana-

Anamaboe (considering the great Expence we have lately been at, for the rebuilding it, and which is unfinish'd, should at present be rated higher).

	£.	s.	d.
<i>Tantumquerry,</i>	651	12	06
<i>Winnebak,</i>	898	12	06
<i>Accra,</i>	1369	12	06
<i>Whydah,</i>	1369	17	06
<i>Commenda,</i>	1071	02	06
<i>Succondée,</i>	1008	02	06
<i>Dixcove,</i>	1305	02	06
<i>Prampram</i>	0000	00	00
<i>James Fort at Gambia,</i>	4242	02	06

£20,900 2 06

Now, in order to make up a Sum sufficient for the Maintenance of these Forts and Settlements, it will be necessary for the Parliament to make a yearly additional Grant of at least 10,900 *l.* 2 *s.* 6 *d.* which Expence can never be put in Competition with the Advantages resulting from this Trade; and of which there is much greater Reason now, than at any other

other Time, to be particularly careful; since if the Event of the *French* Armaments sent to *Africa* should not turn out to our Disadvantage (which can hardly be hoped, without we dispatch a Squadron there immediately, or reinforce that in the *West-Indies*, in such a Manner as to enable it to detach a Number of Ships upon the Coast of *Africa*, without weakening itself, so as to risk all our Sugar Islands) their Plan of pursuing this Commerce, by the great Encouragement given to it above any other Branch of Trade, in order to benefit their Sugar Colonies, which by this Means supply almost all *Europe* with this Commodity; by the Advantages they have at home, and the large Price they sell their Negroes for, (which is much more than any *British* Subjects can get for theirs) must in the End (without we exert ourselves, as well by proper Encouragement to the Traders, as in supporting and improving our Forts and Settlements upon the Coast, which should be properly guarded by our maritime Force, to avoid Surprise in the Interim) prevail; and they must rival us in the Slave,

Gum, Gold, and Elephant Tooth Trades, if not drive us from the Coast itself, and, by a necessary Consequence, monopolize the whole Sugar Trade; by which they will not only ruin our Colonies, bid fair for supporting all their unwarrantable Claims upon our *North - American* Settlements, but at the same Time drain this Kingdom, and that of *Ireland*, of 131,300*l.* annually, our Exports included, for what should be our own Commodities — our Sugars.

This will not appear exaggerated, when we consider the real Situation of the Forts upon the Coast, the Address of the *French* in inticing the Natives into their Interest; and the Advantages given by them both in the Slave and Sugar Trade — for Instance, the *French* exempt one half of their Duties on Sugar, and and all other *American* Products, taken in Exchange for Negroes, carried to their Plantations, in *Africa*.

, If

If it should be judged that this is a Time not fit to encrease any Annual Grants, when the Support of the War demands so much, and we have as yet not found ways and Means for the extraordinary Supplies it will require this Year; a Means might be found of procuring the *African* Company what deficiency there is in their annual Grant, by repealing in part the Clause of the Act of their Institution which enacts. “ That the said Committee “ shall and may from Time to Time invest “ part of the Money in their Hands, as “ they shall judge necessary in the purchase “ of Goods and Stores, but it shall not “ be lawfull for the said Committee “ to carry, or cause to be carried, or “ exported from *Africa*, any Negroes, ” &c. † For if they were permitted to purchase, Slaves with the Money in their Hands in exchange for Goods and Stores, before they applied it to the Payment of Salaries, &c. They might find a Means of doubling the Sum Granted, by which they would require no additional Supply from the Government, which would in
my

† See p. 51 and 52.

my humble Opinion, be a Means of advancing the Negroe Trade, and terminate to the Advantage of our Sugar Colonies. For by this Means the Traders upon the Coast might be furnished without loss of time with the best Negroes (those of the Gold Coast, and *Whydah*,) and the Planters would never be imposed upon with the worst, (which are reckon'd those of *Calabar Congo, Angolo, &c.*) And as those of the Gold Coast and *Whydah*, are the only proper Negroes, for the preservation of our Sugar Colonies, the Company should be compell'd to purchase no other, to be sold at a fixed price, allowing 2 *per Cent*, for Agency, and the Liberty of sending them upon their own Account, after having kept them during a limited Time upon the Coast for Sale, to the *West Indian* Islands.

I have made many more Observations upon our *West Indian* and *African* Trades; but as these are the most Material for their immediate Security, and as the delaying their publication would admit of no Excuse; since the Avenues to a personal
Con-

Conference with all great Men, are always so impeded as to permit nothing that has the resemblance of a Schemist to arrive at their presence : I have for the present contented myself with addressing these Pages through this Channel, to you, Sir ; If I find that any of my Hints have been improved, or my Remarks turned to the Advantage of this Nation, I may be induced at a proper time, to dedicate to you, Sir, what I have at present suppressed, as taking up too great a compass, and by that means preventing what I have now set before you appearing, in time. However, I have thought it essential to lay before you the following Disposition of our Naval Armament ; as also the subjoined Remarks upon our Taxes, and the Schemes proposed for raising the extraordinary supplies of the current Year.

In order to secure our Colonies abroad, and this Kingdom from any Attacks of the Enemy by Sea, protect our Trade, and annoy theirs, it will be necessary to have some settled regular Plan of stationing as well our Fleets as Convoys ; that by the
first

first our Possessions may never be naked ; and by the second, that our Merchantmen need not be obliged to make great Delays in tarrying for Convoys, and by that means lose the Markets for their Cargoes ; and at the same Time run the Risque of their being spoilt, if perishable Commodities ; or unprotected brave the Enemy's Cruizers, and frequently lose all. I say, in order to prevent these fatal Consequences, it will be necessary to have a settled Number of Ships employed to secure our Colonies, which should be regularly and punctually replaced, upon any part being damaged, or out of Order ; and our Convoys should be fixed to certain Periods, when the Merchants might be sure of their Departures, and regulate themselves accordingly.

To form a competent Idea of what Number and Force these several Squadrons and Convoys may consist, it will be requisite not only to consider the Number of Ships we can at any one Time keep in Commission, and also fit for Service, and what Number of Men will be requisite

requisite for their manning ; but also what Force the Enemy can reasonably put to Sea, and what Squadrons she must necessarily keep in certain Destinations abroad, to prevent our surprising her Colonies ; as also what Ships they will then have to spare for Convoys, and how many can remain in their Ports. But as I cannot assume to myself any superior Knowledge to the rest of my Countrymen, either in regard to the precise Strength and State of our Fleet, any more than to that of the *French*, I shall make my Calculations from such published Accounts of both, as have been reckoned most authentic, and which, it is reasonable to suppose, cannot be very wide of the Truth.

Our Fleet then, consists, at present, of 270 Ships, of the following Rates.

- 5 of the 1st Rate, 100 Guns.
- 11 of the 2d Rate, 90 Guns.
- 53 of the 3d, of 80, 74, 70, 66,
and 64 Guns.
- 69 of the 4th Rate, of 60, 58,
and 50 Guns.

(66)

38 of the 5th Rate, of 44 and 40
Guns.

56 of the 6th Rate, of 30, 24, 22,
and 20 Guns; and

44 Sloops, besides Fireships, Hoys,
Transports, Smacks, Lighters,
— Hulks, and Royal Yachts.

270

Now let us consider the Force of the
French Fleet, and judge by that what
Number of these it will be necessary for
us to have in Commission, and ready up-
on any Occasion.

F R E N C H F L E E T.

6 of 80 Guns.

29 of 74 and 70 Guns.

32 of 68, 66, 64, and 60 Guns.

9 of 50 Guns.

16 of 30 Guns.

15 of 28, 26, 24, and 20 Guns.

2 of 12 Guns.

—
109

Out of these *France* must keep a Squa-
dron in the *West-Indies* of at least 10
Men

Men of War, which we may suppose will comprise 1 of 80 Guns, 2 of 74 and 70, 4 of 68, 66, 64, and 60 Guns, 2 of 30 Guns, and one of 20 Guns.

	80 Guns.	70 Guns.	60 Guns.	50 Guns.	30 Guns.	20 Guns.
Ships as above.	1	2	4		2	1
On the Coast of <i>Africa</i> , another of 4 Men of War, one of 74, 1 of 60, 1 of 50, and 1 of 30 Guns.		1	1	1	1	
One at <i>North-America</i> of 7, composed of 2 of 74 and 70 Guns, 3 of 60, one of 30, and 1 of 20.		2	3		1	1
One in the <i>East-Indies</i> of 6, consisting of 1 of 74, 1 of 68, 2 of 50, 1 of 30, and 1 of 20 Guns.		1	1	2	1	1

| 1 | 6 | 9 | 3 | 5 | 3

And we may reasonably compute their different Convoys, at 18 of these Rates.

| 7 | 3 | 1 | 5 | 2

K 2

So

So, that according to this Computation,
the *French* will still have the following
Ships in Harbour, ready for Expeditions,
Viz.

5 of 80 Guns.

6 of 74 and 70 Guns.

20 of 68, 66, 64, and 60 Guns.

5 of 50 Guns.

6 of 30 Guns.

10 of 28, 26, 24, and 20 Guns.

2 of 12 Guns.

—

54

Now, according to the following Distribution of our Fleet, we shall not only have superior Squadrons to the *French*, stationed in every Place requisite for the Protection of our Trade, and the Security of our Colonies and Settlements, as well in *America* and *Africa*, as in *Asia*; but also 73 Ships of different Rates (some of which we may suppose in Dock either building or repairing) to detach as well as to reinforce any of the stationed Squadrons as for such Expeditions as may be requisite
to

(69)

to undertake against the *French Colonies*,
Settlements, &c.

R A T E S.

Destinations.

	1 st	2 ^d	3 ^d	4 th	5 th	6 th	Sloops
Upon the Coast of <i>England</i> , to convoy Coastwise			5	7	2	3	3
Cruizing in the Channel, serving also for Convoys to the <i>Dutch</i> and <i>Flemish</i> Merchantmen				4	2	8	6
At <i>Deal</i>			1	1	1		1
At the <i>Nore</i>	1	1					
At <i>Chatham</i>		1					
At <i>Portsmouth</i> and <i>Spithead</i> , always ready upon any Emergency	2	2	4	6	1	3	2
At <i>Plymouth</i> in the <i>Sound</i> , and in the Har- bour of <i>Hamoaze</i> , al- ways ready		1	3	2		1	1
Upon the Coast of <i>Ireland</i> , serving also for Convoys to Mer- chantmen to and from <i>England</i>			2	4	3	1	
In the Bay of <i>Biscay</i> At <i>Gibraltar</i> , and in the <i>Mediterranean</i> , to prevent the <i>French</i> coming into the Ocea- n, or a Junction of their Fleets, or the <i>Spanish</i> , in case of a War with <i>Spain</i> .	1	1	6	5	2	1	4
		1	7	5	2	1	4

Carried over 4 | 7 | 28 | 34 | 13 | 18 | 21

Destinations

(70)

Destinations.

R A T E S.

	1 st	2 ^d	3 ^d	4 th	5 th	6 th	Sloop.
Brought forward	4	7	28	34	13	18	21
At <i>Jamaica</i> , and the <i>Leeward-Islands</i> , to replace, from Time to Time, those upon the Coast of <i>Africa</i> , that shall be foul, or in want of Repair		1	2	8	1	6	2
Constantly upon the Coast of <i>Africa</i> , being replaced, when foul, &c. from the <i>West- Indian Squadron</i> .			2	3	1		
At <i>North-America</i>			3	5	1	1	2
In the <i>East-Indies</i>			2	3	1	2	
	4	8	37	53	17	27	25

C O N V O Y S.

For *West-Indian*
Convoys, half of which
to be kept at *Jamaica*
and *Antigua*; and the
other half at *Spithead*,
or *Plymouth*, to go and
come alternately; two
in each Convoy being
detached, in a certain
Latitude, with the
Merchantmen bound to
North-America.

For *Mediterranean*,
Spanish, and *Portuguese*
Convoys

For *East-India* Con-
voys, as far as *St. He-
lena*

For *Baltick* Con-
voys.

		1	4	2	5		
		1	2	1	2		
		1	2		1		
			1	2			1
	4	8	40	62	22	35	26

Of the 73 Ships remaining as yet un-
 applied, we may reasonably suppose there
 may be 20 of the following Rates, either
 building, repairing, or unfit for Service,
 (*viz.* 1 of the 2d Rate, 4 of the 3d, 2 of
 the 4th, 7 of the 5th, 2 of the 6th, and
 four Sloops) then our reserved Fleet will
 consist of the following Rates

1 of the 1st Rate,
 2 of the 2d
 9 of the 3d
 5 of the 4th
 9 of the 5th
 13 of the 6th, and
 14 Sloops.

—
 53

As these 53 Men of War, as well as
 the preceding 197, should be constantly
 kept in Commission, and therefore com-
 pletely manned, we must include them
 in the Number that require their Com-
 plement; so that our whole Fleet in
 Commission, and ready for Service, will
 require 73,640 Seamen, including Ma-
 rines; as will be seen by the following
 Estimate.

N^o

N ^o of Ships.	Rates	Men requisite to man them to their Complements.
5—	1—	4250
10—	2—	7500
49—	3—	25680
67—	4—	13500
31—	5—	7750
48—	6—	10560
40—	Sloops	4400
Total 250		73,640

Thus it appears, that to man our whole Navy (such a one as may regain our Losses, in the *Mediterranean*, and at least an Equivalent for those in *America*, 'till when we cannot hope either for an advantageous, honourable, or lasting Peace) it will require 18,640 Men more than the Parliament has granted this Year for our Navy, which will put us to the additional Expence of 765,280 *l.*, including Ordnance for Sea-Service; the 55,000 Men allowed this Year, occasioning an Expence of 2,860,000 *l.* including Ordnance for Sea-Service.

But

But what will 700,000 *l.* appear, when put in Competition with the Advantages we may promise ourselves from such a Navy ! It would be needless to repeat in this Place, both his Majesty's Recommendation of vigorous Measures, and their Efficacy : Surely then our Bulwarks, our Floating Towers, which alone command us the Respect both of our Friends and Foes, should be put in such a State of Defence, and so employed, as to draw all the Advantages we can reap from them ; and I believe no body can be so very void of Consideration as to imagine they are any thing more than a burthen-some Expence to us, as long as they are in *Ordinary* ; why then should we hesitate to put all the Ships in Commission that can bear the Seas ? I need not, I believe, ask this Question a second Time, Sir, of you,——but, perhaps, in return, you may complain of the want of Hands : I own the Complaint may be just, but it is not irremediable.

I could have wished to have seen, at the End of the last War, a Project executed which was then proposed, of registering all the Seamen who had been employed, and continuing them a small annual Præmium, in permitting them to serve the Merchants in any short Voyages, and be ready, upon Call, on any Emergency : This Scheme, Sir, would have prevented that tyrannical Method of *Pressing*, which, after all, does but ill succeed ; however, it has been judged expedient, and therefore it should not be condemned, until some other can be devised.

I have taken the Pains to examine many Schemes that I have heard for the manning our Fleet upon an Exigence ; but none appears to me effectual, but that of obliging every Sea-port in *England, Scotland, Ireland, Guernsey, Jersey, Man,* and the other inferior Islands (particularly the *Orkneys*, as the *Scotch* are the best Sailors) to furnish a stipulated Number in Proportion to the Shipping they actually employ :

employ: This should be extended to *North America*, that Seminary of Seamen; which, I am told, might occasionally furnish us with 30,000 able Mariners. To this may be added, an Obligation upon the *East-India* Company furnishing a Quota out of every Ship before they pay their Seamen, who should be allowed two Months Leave of Absence, before they went on board a Man of War: All the Whale-Fishery Ships should be under the like Obligation; as well as the Herring-Fishery; who might furnish many useful Hands. If the Merchant Service should run any Risque of being prejudiced by such a Proposal, they might be allowed to employ a greater Number of Foreigners, *Dutch, Danes, Swedes, &c.*, who would be glad to serve them, as our Pay is much superior to what is given by their Merchants, and the Labour less, as we employ more Hands on board Ships of the same Burthen with theirs,

If these Hints should be judged worthy of Consideration, I should be glad to see an Act passed, as soon as possible, upon

any Plan fimilar to this ; for we cannot too foon put our Fleet into as respectable a Condition as poffible : The *French* employing all the Carpenters of what Nation foever they can get, to form an Armament, which may, but too foon, be able to cope with ours.

When I fay this, I don't mean that we can reasonably apprehend that their Navy, will at any Time, thefe ten Years, be as numerous and formidable as ours : But as they have no Occafion to keep Fleets ftationed in the Bay of *Bifcay*; the *Mediterranean*, or indeed in any Part of *Europe*, as we have, and in which we cannot employ lefs than ninety Ships of different Rates, if they fhould encrease their Marine only *one third* more than it is, as they do not labour under the fame Inconvenience as we, in regard to its manning (they having long fince practifed the Scheme of Registering their Seamen) they would be more than a Match for us ; as may be eafily perceived by the foregoing Estimates, fince they may already keep 54 of their Ships of different Rates
unemployed

unemployed in their Ports fit for Expeditions, and we cannot have conveniently *unemployed* more than 73 ; so that if their Marine were increased only one third more than what it is, they would have 145 Ships ; 90 of which might be employed against us ; and, to oppose these, we should only have 73 Sail.

Now, even this Calculation is upon the Supposition that our Fleet were as formidable, as I have represented it in the foregoing Estimate ; but if we were to employ but forty thousand odd Seamen on board, a greater Number than which, I am told, there is not actually employed, at present, we could have no manner of Chance, either of supporting the Sovereignty of the Sea, or even protecting our Colonies and ourselves.

But we will, for the present, suppose the *French* entirely unemployed about constructing new Ships, and that they only intend, in the Course of this War, to make use, to the best Advantage, of those Ships which now actually compose their
Fleet ;

Fleet ; is there no Reason to fear, that if we do not listen to the Proposals of the *Spanish* Court for an Accommodation, by her Arbitration, that his Catholic Majesty will throw his Weight into the *French* Scale ? I say, Sir, can you, who are so well acquainted with the Secrets of Cabinets, imagine that the Motions of the *Spaniards* at *Ceuta*, the Favour they have already shewn to the *French* at *Algezires*, and the Equipment of their Fleets in their Ports, portend only a Resolution of abiding by the strictest Neutrality ? We will suppose, then, that the Court of *Madrid*, after she shall have exhausted her whole Stock of Friendship upon us in Overtures of Peace, will break, and make a Composition in favour of *France*. Can it be credited, that her Marine will not be composed of 36 Sail, of different Rates, fit to keep the Sea ? If it cannot be credited, as I believe you, Sir, particularly, and every one the least acquainted with the State of the *Spanish* Fleet, must immediately avow ; the *French* Fleet will be increased one third, without any additional new Ships of their own ; and what

Apology

Apology, then, can be made to this Nation for not putting our Marine upon the most advantageous Footing? — What Excuse can be offered for not trying every Scheme that wears the least Air of Practicability for completely manning a sufficient Force by Sea? — But I forget myself in the Warmth of my Argument; the Honour and Happiness of my Country, are apt to have this Effect upon me, — but the least Recollection tells me, I am writing to a Statesman, who requires but a Hint, — a very Hint, to pursue any Measures that may benefit his Country; and that to apply a Microscope to your Eye, upon such an Occasion, is not to assist the visual Orb, but to aggravate the Sight.

The Measures I have prescribed, like all other vigorous ones, require the Sinews of War for their enforcing; therefore let us consider a little what may be the most effectual Means of procuring the Supplies necessary for carrying on the War, with the least Detriment to our Trade, and the least Oppression to the Subject.

I believe I have no Occasion, then, to enter into a Disquisition to prove that the Encrease, or even the Continuance, of the present National Debt, can be of no Advantage, either in a political or commercial Light, to this Nation——this Doctrine has long since been exploded ; and I think, we may, on the other hand, venture to affirm, that if we continue borrowing Money, on the same Terms we did the last War, we shall increase the National Debt to 115000,000 *l.* this War, (supposing it to continue as long as the former) and then, perhaps, in a few Years, we may have another Rupture ; for the *French* will be sure to infringe upon our Colonies, and give us many other Causes of Renewal of Hostilities, as long as they are convinced they can run u 30,000,000 in Debt, and by that Means increase in Proportion the annual Interest, which must be paid by Taxes, that can never fail to clog Trade, in such a Manner, as to increase the Price of all Necessaries of Life ; not only in Proportion o the Taxes levied, but at least double, by Means of the Increase of Price the
Commoditie

Commodities receive by passing through many Hands, before they come at the Consumer. Since by this they will, in the End, attain the Destruction of our foreign Trade, and the Erection of theirs upon its Ruin: So that another War, with a few Years of Peace, will succeed another, and so on,——'till we may present ourselves with the View of an accumulated Debt of 300,000,000; for which an Interest of nine Millions must be paid, supposing it at Three *per Cent*.

If this should ever be the Case, in what a Situation must the Commerce of this Nation be? at what Markets shall we find a Vent for our Commodities, when we are already rivalled in many Branches of our foreign Trade, particularly the Woollen *Levant*, by the *French*, on account of the Cheapness of their Goods compared to ours, although the Taxes which pay the Interest of the National Debt amount, at present, to no more than about two Millions and a half; and when our Commodities must then be increased at least treble in their Price before they reach a foreign Market.

M

Perhaps

Perhaps I may be answered, that *France* can never pursue this Plan of running us into Debt, and by that Means increasing our Taxes, and in the End ruining our Trade, without affecting herself the same Way, by the Support of her Troops, the Increase of her Marine, and the Execution of her Measures.——In Answer to this, it will be found, that though their Taxes increase, and their Revenues be exhausted, their Manufactures will not be so sensibly affected hereby as ours, by Means of the greater Number of Hands in *France*, which will ever keep the Price of Labour low, and the Start they have already gained of us with respect to the Prices of their Merchandizes. Besides, whenever Necessity requires it, *France* can raise some Millions by the Alteration of the Value of their Coin, as has been practiced more than once. Without an Increase of the Price of Labour, our poor People, who are already, by the enormous Taxes upon the Necessaries of Life, and the high Price of Provisions, reduced to such a Pass, that many can scarcely get Bread

Bread for themselves and Families, will never be able to support any additional Imposts upon what are esteemed the Essentials of Subsistence; and as the Increase of the Price of Labour must necessarily occasion an Advance in the Price of the Commodities manufactured, which must, in the End, destroy our Foreign Trade; I believe little need be added to prove that all new Taxations, directly or indirectly, upon the Necessaries of Life, should be laid aside.

The borrowing of Money, or funding, is attended with so many bad Consequences to the Nation, by the Necessity of raising Taxes, as well to pay the Interest thereof, as for Douceurs or Præmiums to the Jobbers, which generally render a low Interest to the Proprietors of Stock, a very high one to the Government, that some other Means should be tried. The only Expedient that can be devised for preventing these Evils for the future, is the raising the Supplies within the Year; and this should be done. By this the Nation would save both the
Interest

Interest and Præmium necessary to be paid with Borrowing and Jobbing, which might be applied to pay off Part of the National Debt ; and this would revive Public Credit, set the Stocks above Par, and turn into the Channel of Commerce, that Money which the Jobber would find no Opportunity of applying to a more lucrative Advantage. By this Means also, that Dissipation and Profusion, which are the constant Attendants upon Laziness, would diminish ; for when the public Funds began to be decreased, by being *paid off*, Interest would naturally lower, and excepting what could be employed in Mortgages, and other private Securities, and for which that exorbitant Interest, that now is given, would be no longer an Inducement ; the Mass of the Publick Debt would be thrown into Commerce, and our idle Annuity holders and Stockholders would find themselves under a Necessity of being useful to their Country, by encreasing our Commerce, and drawing the Wealth of other Nations to this Emporium of Trade. This would not be the only Advantages
resulting

resulting from raising the Supplies within the Year; for as then all our Contracts would be paid with ready Money, our Fleet and Army would not only be furnished with better Provisions of every kind, but much cheaper; and if they gained only *Ten per Cent.* as there is much Reason to believe, they would by prompt Payment, upon Five Millions, which we may suppose will be expended this Year, in Contracts upon our Navy and Land Forces, we should make a Saving of 500,000 *l. Sterl.* which might be applied either to paying off Part of the National Debt, or towards raising the Supplies for the following Year; and by that Means we might discontinue any oppressive Tax to the Poor, producing that Sum.

But without noticing any other Advantage that might reasonably result from this Scheme, I will consider the most eligible Means of raising the Supplies requisite for the current Year, within the Year.

The

The Parliament has already made the following Provisions, *viz.*

	£	s.	d.
By the Land-Tax, at 4 s. which is given for	2000,000	00	0
The Duty on Malt, Mum, Cyder and Per- ry, given for	750,000	00	0
And the Guinea Lottery, from whence the Government is to reserve one Moiety of the Produce, being 1,050,005 l. 5s.	525,002	12	6

The Total whereof is but 3,275,002 12 6

But as it is computed that the Service of this Year, cannot be effectually performed, for less than Nine Millions, we still stand in need of near Six Millions, therefore other Provisions must be made.

The Plan which stands foremost in the Class of reasonable Ones, for raising the extraordinary Supplies, is a new Assessment

ment of the Land Tax, by which it is computed a Million a Year more may be brought into the Government, than is at present produced by it. This certainly is a very just Expedient, and whatever Opposition some few may make to it, under pretence of the Hardships they would labour under, in Paying an exact Quota; as the Improvements they have been at the Expence of, are the Causes of the increase of their Lands; should be looked upon as only regarding some few Particulars, whose Interest should always submit to that of the Community — otherwise we shall find all Laws Ineffectual, since the Execution of them, must clash with the Interest of some Individuals.

This Plan, then, can meet with no Antagonists, but such as are prejudiced by their Interest, of the Land Tax Act, being ineffectually executed: But as this new Assesment cannot be made for this Year, or perhaps the Next, we cannot comprehend it within the Schemes for raising the Supplies for the current Year.

Mr.

Mr. *Postlethwayt*'s personal Tax, seems to have a great Analogy with that proposed upon Houses; and as this latter carries with it a greater facility in the Execution, and at the same Time does not wear the Appearance of a Poll Tax, and is not so oppressive to the Subject, I am inclined to give it the Preference. It does not follow that every Person of the different Ranks, rated in his List, should be possessed of Fortunes, or be in circumstances equivalent; and if any compulsion were to be used to oblige every Person to give in an exact Account of his Fortune or Effects, it would be disagreeable to all, and particularly detrimental to the mercantile Part of his List; otherwise a Person with a very slender Income, perhaps an uncertain one, would be necessitated to pay an equal Tax with one of an over-grown Fortune. Law and Physic would furnish us with many Instances of this kind; for in both, for the general, either great Fortunes are made by the Practitioners, or else they perish *Secundum Naturam*, or starve according to Law. But in respect
to

to the Tax upon Houses, as no body would chuse to live in one of greater Rent than his Circumstances could afford ; neither would he be assessed at a higher Rate, than bore a Proportion to the Rent of his House.

1. The Tax upon Houses, at a reasonable Computation, is supposed to produce a Million and half ; without including those under 5 *l.* a Year, which should be entirely exempt ; since they can be inhabited by none but poor Artists and Labourers.

2. A Tax upon Servants, in and out of Livery, would certainly produce a great Income on the one hand ; or if we could suppose, (which to judge by the Extravagance and Luxuriance of the present Age is not probable) that any considerable Number would, by this Means, be thrown out of Place, they could not be more opportunely disengaged for his Majesty's Service, either by Land or Sea. But as it is reasonable to imagine, not an Eighth Part of what are employed would be dismissed on

N

this

this Account, and as I have heard it computed, there are 250,000 in *Great-Britain*; if they were taxed, upon an Average, at 5 *l.* each, this Tax would produce, at least, a Million.

3. A Tax upon Saddle-Horses, kept for Diversion, might be a further Means of increasing the Revenue for the current Year.

.4 No body (but the Proprietors) could object to a Tax being laid upon all public Diversions. For Instance, a Masquerade Ticket should be doubled, and the additional Guinea appropriated to the public Service; a like Tax to be laid upon those of Ridottos. The Boxes at the Opera should be a Guinea, and the Gallery half a Guinea; the Playhouse Boxes 7 *s.* 6 *d.* Pit 5 *s.* First Gallery 4 *s.* Upper Gallery 3 *s.* The Admittance at *Vauxhall* and *Ranelagh* doubled; all which additional Prices should be applied to make up the Supplies for the current Year. These last two Taxes cannot, I imagine, be estimated at less than half a Million, considering

ing the great Number of Cavaliers, and *public-diversion Resorters*, that abound in this Age of *Trouble and Pleasure*.

5. Next to this might follow, a Tax upon Taverns, Bagnios, and what are called *French Wine-houses*. It is unreasonable that the first of these, some of which take 40 *l.* a Day, should be obliged to pay no more, in a Tax for a Licence, than a little Alehouse, that vends, perhaps, half a Crown's worth of Liquor in the same time. The second of these, if they can be supposed of any Use, should at least be liable to some Impost, since of all other Places their Rates are the most extravagant, and their Profits the greatest; and indeed most, if not all of them, may be put upon the same Footing with the *French Wine-houses*, which every body knows are Nicknames for Brothels. If, as it is pretended, these Miscreants (the Keepers of Brothels) can find means to elude the Execution of Justice, they should be obliged to make some Atonement to the Public the only way they can; and a Tax, ever so enormous, cannot be thought too

burthenfome upon them, fince the entire Destruction of them, would be one of the greateft Services Society could receive from any ineffectual Tax. The Taverns may merit fome Commiferation ; for that Reafon I fhould think their additional Tax fhould not be above 40 or 50 *l. per Annum* : But the rating of this fhould depend, in fome Refpect, upon their Vent of Liquors, and particularly *French Wines*.

6. The foregoing Tax naturally leads to another, that every Subject, who is not enervated with Luxury, would rejoice to fee impofed, particularly at this Period, when our inveterate Foes are torturing their Imagination to devise more effectual Means of ruining our Trade, and deftroying our Navigation. Undoubtedly, Sir, you anticipate my Meaning ; for I certainly would advife a Tax, amounting to a Prohibition of *French Wines* * and Brandy.

* As *Ireland* is to be fo much protected (if the foregoing Plan of the Deftination of our Fleets, &c. fhould

dies. I fear again our great Propensity to Voluptuousness, would induce us, at the greatest Expence, to indulge this, as well as many more of our over-governing Appetites; but I know of none that can be tolerated, which should be so much clogged as this with Imposts.

The five last Taxes must needs be allowed to center, and indeed exist, in Luxury, (nor can the preceding, which does not extend to Houses under *5 l. per Annum*, be supposed to affect much, if at all, the poor Manufacturers and Labourers); and surely no Rationalist will aver, that they are not fixed upon proper Objects; for if Men will run headlong to their own Ruin (which the four last Articles tend particularly to facilitate) it is but reasonable the State, who suffers so much in one Respect

should be executed) it would be but reasonable that she should furnish us, at least, with a Sufficiency to bear the Expence she will put us to; and as *French* Wine is purchased there as cheap as *Port* is here, and is drank in very great Profusion; surely a Tax upon it, at this Time, would neither be improper, or detrimental to the Health or Purse of the *Irish*.

pect by it, should draw some Advantage from it in another.

7. To give the Ladies an Opportunity of contributing to the Exigencies of the State, a Tax upon Jewels might be a Means of making them doubly ornamental to the Sex,—to display their Charms and their Patriotism, both at once, to a greater Advantage. And as I have a very great Opinion of the Patriotism, both of the Ladies and Gentlemen of the present Age; it would be proper to give them every Opportunity of testifying it; for this Reason also——

8. A general Free-Gift should be set on foot, whereby all Persons, of whatever Rank and Denomination, might give further Testimony of their Attachment to their Country; and as many rich Persons, though they might indulge themselves in all the preceding, and many other Luxuries, would still be conscious, that they did not assist, in Proportion to their Fortunes, the State in its present Exigence: By this Means they might disburthen
their

their Consciences, and relieve their Country.

As Smuggling is the principal Cause that our present Duties, do not furnish the State with the necessary Supplies to carry on the War, without further Imposts ; and as these public Robbers, the *Smugglers*, at the same Time they are so detrimental to us, are of the greatest Advantage to our declared Enemies, if a Means could be devised of considerably checking if not entirely demolishing their detestable Trade, surely it would be prudent at this Time to execute any Scheme, that promised these Advantages. Although these illegal Traders, extend their Commerce to many Articles of *French* and other Products, it is Notorious that the Smuggling of Tea, is the Principal source of their illegal Gains ; this would be at an End, if the present Tax were taken off that Commodity, and an Impost put upon every Family that used this Herb, which might be easily Effected, by obliging the Master of every Family, to make Affidavit whether or no any Tea
were

were used in his House ; since it is not to be supposed that any such would perjure himself, for saving, — if the Master of the greatest Family, 20 s. a Year, which should be the highest Tax ; or 5 s. a Year, if of the lowest sort that drink Tea. But if it might be apprehended that some would Transgress ; the Pillory, or some adequate Punishment should, as in other cases of Perjury be strictly Inflicted, besides a pecuniary Fine, upon any that will dare transgress.

The fair Dealer would receive great Benefit by it, as none could afford to sell Tea cheaper than the Market price ; which is now done in every part of this Kingdom, but more particularly upon the *Western, Southern, and Eastern Coasts of England*, in so much that it's computed above Two thirds of the Tea drank in *Great Britain* is run. The perplexities and disquietudes given the fair Dealer, by Excise Officers, on pretence of searching, would no longer continue. The *East-India* Company would be great Gainers by this, as well as the Consumers ; and the *Public* Revenue which upon an Average,

Average, has received for some Years past 1300000*l.* upon Tea, would be very much increased if not doubled by this new method of Taxation.

If these Institutions could not furnish the State with a Sufficiency to carry on the War with Vigour, many others, of the like Nature, might be tried ; so that nothing can apologize for not endeavouring (with all Probability of Success) to raise the Supplies within *th* Year, by which so many evil Consec^oes will be removed.

Having thus, Sir, taken the Liberty to give you my Sentiments, in this public Manner, upon the Affairs and Commerce of *North America*, and the *West-Indies* ; our *African* Trade ; the Destination of our Squadrons and Convoys ; new Taxes ; and the Schemes proposed for raising the extraordinary Supplies for the current Year ; I have nothing at present more to add, but to desire you, if you think any of my Observations upon our *North American* Colonies, the Security of our *West-Indian* Trade, and that of *Africa*, with our Settlements upon that Coast, upon which the former so much depends ; merit Attention, to not let the present Opportunity slip of turning them to Advantage——

vantage — to pay particular Regard to what I have urged in regard to the Destination of our Squadrons and Convoys, with the Necessity of our Navy being reinforced ; as upon that our All depends ; not only as a commercial Nation, and as Sovereigns of the Ocean, — bnt also as a People. What I have said, with Respect to new Taxes and Imposts, may, perhaps, furnish some Hints, before it is too late, to raise the Supplies within the Year ; and in such a Manner as not to be burthensome to the laborious Part of us.

I am, S I R,

with all due Deference,

Your most obedient, and

very humble Servant,

A MERCHANT of London.

F I N I S.

E R R A T A.

P. 4. l. 17, r. *descant* for *discant*. Ibid 4 l. from the bottom, for *preventatives*, r. *preventives*. P. 6, l. 19. for 530,00, r. 55,000. *ib.* in last l. for 53,000 r. 55,000. P. 9, l. 16, dele *and*. P. 31, l. 1. for *of* r. *in*. P. 32, l. 3. from the bottom, for *Emigrams*, r. *Emigrants*. P. 46, l. 1. for 1758, r. 1558. P. 55, l. 6, for *Aecra*, r. *Accra*. *ib.* l. 7, for *Wydah* r. *Whydah*. P. 56, 4 l. from the bottom, for *Markens* r. *Markets*. P. 79, l. 14, for *many* r. *may*. P. 60. last l. for *in* r. *from*.

